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Wheeler: Getting to Guilty

COMMENT

Getting to Guilty: The Necessary Shift
to Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing
By Paige Wheeler*

ABSTRACT
In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General, Sally Yates, declared that
the Department of Justice would shift its focus to pursuing individual accountability for cases of corporate wrongdoing. This shift reflects a change
in directives, as the Department of Justice commonly resolved cases of
corporate wrongdoing through the companies themselves prior to what is
now commonly known as the Yates Memorandum. The Yates Memorandum centers on the conclusion that one of the most successful ways to
tackle corporate misconduct is by making sure that the individuals who are
committing the wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions. The
Yates Memorandum hopes to achieve this goal of individual accountability by implementing incentives for large corporations to cooperate with the
Department of Justice. Prosecuting corporate crime, however, presents
unique issues that will likely still make holding individuals accountable
for their corporate wrongdoing a challenge, regardless of the new directives set forth in the Yates Memorandum. Although the Yates Memorandum will not resolve all of the challenges involved in prosecuting corporate crimes, it is a necessary shift in the right direction that is an effective
use of the Department of Justice’s resources in an effort to identify the
culpable individuals who commit corporate crimes and hold them accountable for their wrongdoing.
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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has fixated on resolving cases
of corporate wrongdoing against the companies themselves first, and then on individuals second.1 In September of 2015, however, Deputy Attorney General Sally
Yates announced new directives for the DOJ regarding companies seeking corporation credit, through what is commonly known as the Yates Memorandum.2
The sole focus of the Yates Memorandum was to announce to the DOJ the new
directives that should be followed in regards to accountability for corporate wrongdoing, which involved a great shift from how these cases were handled in the past. 3
This new shift, directing attention to holding individuals accountable for corporate
wrongdoing, came at a time when the DOJ was in a need of a change in approach
to this problem, which in the eyes of many, was getting out of hand.4 Now, with the
financial crisis of 2008 in the rearview,5 the DOJ has acknowledged its previous
shortcomings and that there are better methods to bring individuals who engage in
corporate wrongdoing to justice.
The corporate crime issue likely got out of hand because it is such a unique and
complex creature, often leaving the DOJ with its hands tied in certain situations.
Obtaining the necessary resources to prosecute corporate crimes of a complex nature presents a challenge in itself, not to mention chancing all of the time and money
spent to litigate a case on the gamble that a jury will be able to return a conviction.
People v. Davis illustrates the difficulties and risks of litigating corporate
crimes of a complicated nature.6 The course of events in Davis exemplifies the extreme difficulty of presenting these infinitely complex cases to a panel of jurors in
a way they can understand, let alone comprehend enough to find there is no reasonable doubt as to the criminal actions of these individuals.7
Even faced with these prosecutorial challenges, the DOJ recognized that there
was room for improvement in the handling of corporate crime through the directives
brought forward in the Yates Memorandum. This shift involved a new focus of

* Paige Wheeler is a 3L at the University of Missouri School of Law. She grew up in Wilton, Iowa,
a small town located roughly 40 miles east of Iowa City. Paige decided to attend college not too far from
home at St. Ambrose University in Davenport, Iowa, where she majored in Political Science and ran on
the Track team. Given her particular interest in criminal law, Paige hopes to find work as a prosecutor
after graduating from law school.
1. William E. Lawler, III & Jeremy Keeney, DOJ’s Yates Memorandum: Focus Enforcement Efforts
on Individuals, 83 DEF. COUNS. J. 200, 203 (2016).
2. Id. at 201.
3. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. 2 (Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with the University of Missouri Business,
Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum] (noting that this memorandum
was also addressed to several assistant attorneys general and all U.S. attorneys).
4. William E. Lawler, III & Jeremy Keeney, White Collar Defense and Investigation and Corporate
Counsel, IADC COMMITTEE NEWSL. 3 (Dec. 2015), https://www.velaw.com/Insights/DOJ-s-YatesMemorandum--Focus-Enforcement-Efforts-on-Individuals/.
5. Kimberly Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis, THE BALANCE (July 1, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679.
6. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014) (noting that this case was not the result of a federal
indictment, but rather one by the state of New York).
7. Sara Randazzo & Nichole Hong, Jury in Dewey Law-Firm Case Felt Inundated by Details, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jury-in-dewey-law-firm-case-inundated-by-details-1445333584.
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holding culpable individuals accountable for their actions, rather than the corporation as a whole.8
Seven months after the Yates Memorandum was issued, in April of 2016, the
DOJ released the Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan,
which is commonly known as the Pilot Program.9 The Pilot Program declared that
full cooperation by companies requires, “as set forth in the [Yates Memorandum]
disclosure on a timely basis of all facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue, including all facts related to involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s officer, employee’s or agents.”10 Therefore, the Yates Memorandum, along with the
Pilot Program, greatly contributes to the newly shaped meaning of “cooperation”
through the DOJ’s concentration on individuals. 11
Although the directive to hold individuals accountable for their corporate
wrongdoing is seen as a favorable move by some, there is also growing concern that
the Yates Memorandum may actually hinder the very objectives it hopes to
achieve.12 Both the legislative and judicial branches of government have expressed
concern that federal prosecutors are attempting to criminalize conduct that is not
criminal by construing the law too broadly, which would ultimately result in overcriminalization.13
United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company is an example of why federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have concerns of over-criminalization resulting from federal prosecutors broadening their interpretations of the law. 14 Pacific Gas and Electric Company involved the DOJ indicting and convicting Pacific
Gas and Company (“PG&E”) on a theory of corporate collective knowledge,15
something that the DOJ has not done in over 30 years.16 After receiving highly controversial grand jury instructions, the grand jury returned an indictment charging
PG&E for “willfully” disregarding federal regulations, despite no evidence showing
that any single employee acted willfully.17 Additionally, PG&E, as a corporation,
was convicted because several employees had knowledge of incriminating practices.18 Those individuals did not face charges themselves.19 Therefore, this decision
directly contradicts the new directives laid out in the Yates Memorandum and
causes speculation that the DOJ has not necessarily changed its ways.
This article will explain and analyze the directives taken by the DOJ to combat
corporate wrongdoing. Part II will consider the unique challenges that prosecuting
8. Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
9. Ann Sultan, What Recent DOJ Corporate Enforcement Actions Mean for Cooperating Companies,
BLOOMBERG BNA 1 (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/BloombergBNA-DOJ-Corporate-Enforcement-Actions.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum and the Federal Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 900
(2016).
13. Id. at 899.
14. United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No.14-cr-00175-TEH, 2016 BL 240175, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
July 26, 2016); Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 12, at 899.
15. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 BL 240175, at *2-5.
16. Stephen P. Solow & Mark L. Farley, What Does a Corporation Have to Know to Be Guilty of a
Crime?: The Conviction of PG&E Bases on Corporate Collective Knowledge, DAILY ENV’T REP. 1
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/162466_PGE_Solow_Farley.pdf.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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corporate crime presents for the DOJ and the criticisms they have faced. Part III
will discuss the new shift of focus to individual accountability taken to address this,
and part IV will examine whether this was the right decision, amid growing concerns of expansive interpretation of the law and over-criminalization.

II.

PROSECUTORIAL CHALLENGES UNIQUE TO CORPORATE CRIME

Especially since the Financial Crisis of 2008, the DOJ has faced extensive criticism for not bringing individuals to justice for committing corporate financial
crimes.20 A recent pattern in the prosecution, or attempted prosecution, of corporate
wrongdoing suggests that law enforcement officials are failing to choose the right
cases, and prosecute them in the courtroom in a comprehendible way to jurors.21
This issue arises because it is unlikely that the average working American can understand the modern financial system, given its immense, overwhelming complexities.22
Taking on a case that is destined for failure does not make good sense, especially when prosecuting individuals for complex corporate crimes. 23 Preparing for
any trial requires vast resources, two of the most important being time and money. 24
Given the depletion of resources resulting from preparing cases of a complex nature
for litigation, it is not a risk prosecutors are often willing to take, nor should they
be expected to.25

A. People v. Davis
A case prosecuted by the Manhattan District Attorney, People v. Davis,26 involved the kind of fraud that is often pursued by the federal government. Its outcome effectively highlights the complications prosecutors face in seeking to hold
individuals accountable for committing crimes of this complex nature. 27
In March of 2014, after a two-year investigation, the state of New York indicted
three individuals who had previously been top executives at Dewey & LeBoeuf
LLP.28 Chairman Steven Davis, former Executive Director, Stephen DiCarmine,
and former Chief Financial Officer, Joel Sanders, were indicted on charges that
“they misled lenders, other lawyers and investors about the firm’s financial health
20. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justice-dept-rules-aimedat-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html.
21. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Has It Become Impossible to Prosecute White-Collar Crime?, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 21, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/has-it-become-impossible-to-prosecute-white-collar-crime-.
22. Id.
23. Russell Mokhiber, 20 Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime, HARV. L. REC. (Mar. 24,
2015), http://hlrecord.org/2015/03/20-things-you-should-know-about-corporate-crime/.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014).
27. Chris Dolmetsch & Tiffany Kary, Dewey & LeBoeuf Case Ends With Hung Jury and Mistrial,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/deweyjudge-declares-mistrial-after-jury-deadlocks-on-chrages.
28. Max Stendahl, Former Dewey Leaders Indicted Over Historic Collapse, LAW360 (Mar. 16, 2014,
10:52 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/515863/former-dewey-leaders-indicted-over-historic-collapse.
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before it spiraled into bankruptcy.”29 The investigation, which led to these charges,
began after a group of Dewey partners pushed Manhattan District Attorney, Cyrus
Vance’s office to investigate possible wrongdoing at the firm.30 One month after
the investigation began in 2012, Dewey filed its Chapter 11 petition declaring bankruptcy, placing them in the record books as the largest U.S. law firm to ever go
bankrupt.31
According to the indictment in the New York State Supreme Court, defendants
“Davis, DiCarmine and Sanders were [each] charged . . . with grand larceny, fraud,
falsifying business records and conspiracy.”32 These allegations “contributed to the
collapse of [the] prestigious international law firm, which forced thousands of people out of jobs and left creditors holding the bag on hundreds of millions of dollars
owed to them.”33 The prosecutors also contended that the defendants falsely reported that Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP was in compliance with a “cash flow covenant,”
which required the firm to maintain a minimum year-end cash flow.34 Further, the
indictment stated that from late 2008 to 2012, Davis, DiCarmine, and Sanders allegedly caused other employees at the firm to make tens of millions of dollars of
fraudulent accounting entries that made Dewey look healthier than it was.35
After a four-month trial, which included testimony from 41 witnesses, the case
alleging that the three former executives were guilty of more than 150 counts in a
financial fraud scheme that collapsed Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, resulted only in
proving that the complexity of the case was too much for jurors to handle.36
The mistrial . . . in the closely-watched case is the latest example of the
hurdles prosecutors face bringing complex financial cases to a jury. Prosecutors and enforcement officials have been criticized for failing to charge
individuals with wrongdoing in the wake of the financial crisis, often opting for large monetary settlements instead. But such cases can be highly
complex and carry long odds of getting past juries with scant financial
backgrounds.37
In sum, the Davis case effectively demonstrates why these types of cases often
never reach the courtroom, but rather result in plea agreements. Thus, there is in
fact a great risk involved in bringing an ambitious case to trial, contrary to popular
belief. This risk involves suffering the loss of an immense amount of time and
money on behalf of the government if anything other than a guilty verdict is returned, as shown here in the Davis case.
The prosecution’s case relied heavily on internal emails and the testimony of
several cooperating witnesses, which included the firm’s former Finance Director,
Frank Canellas, who informed the jury that he provided defendants Davis and Sanders with a list of accounting tricks in order to help conceal the firm’s financial
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7.
Id.
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troubles.38 Although the defense called no witnesses, the prosecution called more
than 40, and defense council chose to use the cross-examination of these witnesses
to prove to the jury that their clients did not know about the fraud. 39 The defense
argument clearly left enough room for reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.
The defense poked holes in Canella’s credibility by depicting him as a bully in the
workplace, and argued that even if the accounting practices were illegal, the prosecution did not show that the three defendant executives had criminal intent. 40 The
defense also provoked doubt by contending that the firm’s accounting was not the
reason for their ultimate collapse, but rather it resulted from certain key partners
leaving the firm.41
The Davis case proved to be too much for the jurors to handle from the start.
“Opening statements turned into an hours-long explanation of concepts like disbursement write-offs and reclassifying lease termination payments.” 42 Prosecutors
struggled to lay out a clear narrative from the beginning, and the jurors’ confusion
continued from this point on.43 This proved to neither be enough to acquit, nor convict the three former executives.44 Yet, at the onset of deliberations, the jury determined various acquittals for various counts that were deemed not as serious as others.45 On the larger counts, however, such as grand larceny, scheme to defraud, violating the Martin Act, and the New York Securities law, the jurors were deadlocked.46
The strenuous deliberations came to an end when the jury sent a note to the
court for the third time expressing that it was deadlocked on the major counts. 47
After the jury indicated that it was “hopelessly” deadlocked, Justice Robert Stolz
asked the jurors if further instruction on the law would help.48 After the jury said
that further instruction on the law would not be beneficial, Justice Stolz declared a
mistrial.49
At the conclusion of all the testimony, and after 22 days and over 120 hours of
deliberations, some of the jurors voiced their frustration at the lack of a verdict.50
The general consensus was that the piles of evidence and testimony were just too
difficult to absorb.51 One juror said that she felt like “people were going a little
crazy toward the end because they really didn’t understand the law” and that “[they]
couldn’t go any further.”52 Another juror said that many jurors made up their minds
early on and favored acquittal on the bulk of the counts, but they refused to budge

38. Brendan Pierson, Judge Declares Mistrial in Criminal Trial of Ex-Dewey & LeBoeuf Executives,
REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-crime-deweyidUSL1N12J1T320151019.
39. Dolmetsch & Kary, supra note 27.
40. Pierson, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. Randazzo, & Hong, supra note 7.
43. Id.
44. Pierson, supra note 38.
45. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7.
46. Pierson, supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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during deliberations.53 A third juror said that there was “absolute confusion” among
the jurors and heated arguments erupted because “some were looking for that smoking gun.”54
The Davis outcome suggests that the prosecutors miscalculated by overwhelming the panel of jurors with too much detail.55 This is evident due to the jurors expressing that they needed “more explanation of what [exactly] made the accounting
adjustments illegal[,] and . . . which exhibits corresponded with which charges.” 56
This issue may very well be where the nucleus of the problem lies: in the fact that
the average juror cannot understand the vast complexities cases of this nature present, and are further challenged to decipher how the complicated situation at hand
is applied to the law.

B.

Has Corporate Crime Grown So Complex That it is Beyond the
Law?

The challenges presented to prosecuting attorneys in People v. Davis57 shed
light on a deeper problem and emerging concern: the idea that due to growing complexities, corporate crime is becoming increasingly difficult to prosecute, which
makes it a crime on the verge of being “beyond the reach of the law.” 58
White-collar crime is not nearly as dramatic and straightforward as violent
crime; however, its financial impact is immense, and can affect a large sum of people.59 As an illustration, if someone with a gun walked into a bank and made off
with less than $5,000, he would likely be charged, convicted at trial without complication, and depending on the defendant’s history, spend at least an estimated five
years in prison.60 Most jurors can easily connect the dots in this type of crime. 61 In
comparison, the estimated range of $300 billion to $600 billion that fraud, con jobs,
and embezzlement reportedly cost taxpayers, coupled with the fact that few, if any,
of the financial executives that commit these crimes serve any time in prison, can
provide for frustration among American taxpayers.62 The problems underlying
complex financial crimes are more complicated than most Americans know.
Violent crimes and white-collar crimes differ in many ways, but above all, the
most important factor that separates the two is the level of understanding required
to investigate the crimes, bring charges, and get a conviction from a panel of jurors.
For example, fraud and money laundering allegations require knowledge of much
different concepts than violent crimes.63 These unique challenges for the government often present themselves long before opening statements begin at trial.64 First,
53. Pierson, supra note 38.
54. Id.
55. Randazzo & Hong, supra note 7.
56. Id.
57. People v. Davis et al., No. 773 (N.Y. 2014).
58. Kolhatkar, supra note 21.
59. Bruce Kennedy, Why White Collar Criminals Often Get Away, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (May
11, 2015, 3:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-away-with-white-collar-crime/.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Could the Complexity of White Collar Crime Help Defendants?, FRANK BURINO,
http://www.frankrubino.com/Legal-Articles/Could-the-Complexity-of-White-Collar-Crimes-Help-Defendants.shtml (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
64. Id.
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law enforcement officials must focus on their most pressing needs, and allocate their
resources accordingly.65 While any complex case can drain resources, white-collar
crimes expend more time and money than most other types of cases. 66 In fact, this
draining of resources, time and money, needed to investigate such activities is one
of the major obstacles in combating white-collar crime, especially when it comes
down to following the money trail.67
Susan Deehan, Chair and CEO of Actionable Intelligence Technology, a developer and supplier of financial investigation systems, expressed that white-collar
crime is far down on the list in terms of closed cases.68 Deehan described “[t]he
reason for this is not inattention or indifference on the part of law enforcement, but
on the complexity of white collar crime and the difficulty of making and proving a
case.”69 In fact, even prosecutors can struggle to understand the complicated financial scenarios encompassed in some white-collar crimes.70 They are often advised
to simplify the issues, something that is easier said than done.71
If a case is headed to a jury . . . the prosecuting attorneys may have the
difficult task [of] turning thousands of pages of financial records, accounting procedures and other complex evidence into information that a jury of
laypeople can easily understand. They face added challenges because jurors are generally unfamiliar with white collar crimes, and the defendants
are often upstanding members of a community.72
The challenges present both in investigating and prosecuting white-collar
crimes, can often result in leaving defendants with opportunities for strong defense
cases.73 If the prosecutor finds difficulty in understanding and sorting through the
intricate link of facts that gave rise to charges, this leaves holes for a defense attorney to identify weaknesses in the evidence, and can use these to create doubt and
make the defendant’s case stronger.74 Needless to say, there are many risks involved
in litigating complex corporate crime cases. To say that prosecutors worry about
whether jurors will understand and buy into a case involving white collar crime is
an understatement.75 This worry could therefore encourage prosecutors to enter into
plea agreements with individuals charged with these types of corporate crimes in
order to avoid the risks involved with taking cases of this nature to trial.76
Likely as a product of these challenges and the risks involved with taking a
multifaceted corporate crime case to trial, the DOJ frequently enters into plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, or non-prosecution agreements in order to
resolve criminal investigations.77 As a result of these types of agreements, many
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Kennedy, supra note 59.
Id.
Id.
Could the Complexity of White Collar Crime Help Defendants?, supra note 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 12, at 900.
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top-level executives are able to insulate themselves from personal accountability,
leaving the corporation itself taking the complete fall and punishment for the criminal conduct of individuals.78

III.

A CHANGE IN DIRECTIVE

Not holding individuals accountable for their white-collar criminal actions has
sparked outrage, especially following the financial crisis of 2008.79 This has forced
the DOJ to acknowledge the issue, and ultimately caused them to take action in
response by issuing new directives to be followed in how corporate wrongdoing is
handled.80

A. The Yates Memorandum
The DOJ’s initial action to getting a grasp on battling the corporate crime problem was through the issuing of a memorandum by Deputy Attorney General, Sally
Yates, which came to be commonly known as the “Yates Memorandum.” 81 The
Yates Memorandum in its entirety focused on the conclusion that one of the most
effective ways to battle misconduct by corporations is by holding accountable those
individuals who are perpetrating the wrongdoing.82
The Yates Memorandum started off by expressing that “[f]ighting corporate
fraud and other misconduct is a top priority of the Department of Justice.” 83 The
measures described in the Yates Memorandum are instructed to be steps that are to
be taken “in any investigation of corporate misconduct.” 84 Notably, Yates said that
“[the] [M]emo is designed to ensure that all attorneys across the Department are
consistent in [their] best efforts to hold to account the individuals responsible for
illegal corporate conduct.”85 Yates expressed that individual accountability is important for a number of reasons: “it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes
changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible
for their actions, and it promotes the public’s confidence in [the] justice system.” 86
The Yates Memorandum specifically instructs the DOJ to look more broadly from
the beginning of its investigation.87 In doing so, the DOJ would focus its collective
attention on both the corporation and the individuals suspected of corporate wrongdoing starting at the onset of an investigation. 88
The Memo has six key steps to be followed in order for the DOJ to support its
pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing.89 The six steps outlined in the Memorandum include the following:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Kolhatkar, supra note 21.
Id.
Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Lawler & Keeney, supra note 4, at 203-04.
Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
Id.
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(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct;
(2) criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals
from the inception of the investigation;
(3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should
be in routine communication with one another;
(4) absent extraordinary circumstances or approved department policy,
the Department will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal
liability when resolving a matter with a corporation;
(5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation
without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and
(6) civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the
company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on
considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay. 90
Deputy Attorney General Yates has also directed certain provisions in the
United States Attorney’s Manual to reflect the changes and that the guidance provided throughout the Memo will be applicable to all of the Department’s future
investigations of corporate wrongdoing.91 Generally speaking, these directives impose various requirements on cooperating companies. 92 Most notable, is the requirement directing such companies being investigated for corporate wrongdoing to affirmatively hand over possible culpable employees.93 For many, this was seen as
the DOJ’s response to Congress and others who have critiqued the DOJ for not
sufficiently going after the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. 94
Now, in light of the Yates Memorandum, the DOJ is explicitly directed to focus its
enforcement efforts on these individuals, who previously may have otherwise escaped liability.95
The Yates Memorandum outlines incentives for corporations to be forthright
with suspected individuals involved in misconduct from the start of the investigation.96 For example, “in order for a company to receive any consideration for cooperation under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the
company must completely disclose to the Department all relevant facts about individual misconduct.”97 Therefore, in order “to be eligible for any credit for cooperation, the company [being investigated] must identify all individuals involved in or
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Lawler & Keeney, supra note 4, at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yates Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
Id. at 3.
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responsible for the misconduct [in question], regardless of their position, status or
seniority, and [further] provide to the Department all facts relating to [the alleged]
misconduct.”98

B. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance
After the Yates Memorandum was published, in April of 2016, the DOJ released the Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan
(“FCPA”).99 The FCPA regulates international corruption through the use of two
approaches.100 These two approaches consist of the accounting provisions, and the
anti-bribery provisions.101 The accounting provisions require subject corporations
to provide regular reports to the SEC, “mandate maintenance of accurate records,
and require the establishment of internal compliance controls.”102 These subject corporations include both foreign and domestic companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges.103 In addition, “the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions criminalize the transfer
of money or other gifts to foreign officials and political actors with the intent to
influence[,] obtain[,] or retain business.” 104 These anti-bribery prohibitions pertain
to conduct by securities issuers, U.S. citizens and entities, and certain foreign nationals and entities.105
The DOJ recognizes that FCPA investigations involve unique challenges that
create a undeniable need for “centralized supervision, guidance, and resolution, including complex issues involving transnational detection, collection of evidence,
and enforcement.”106 Due to this, the Fraud Section frequently partners with the
United States Attorney’s Office on these matters. 107 As a whole, the DOJ is committed to enhancing its efforts to uncover and prosecute both individuals and companies for violations of the FCPA.108
The FCPA’s plan has in fact its own memorandum written by Andrew Weissmann, Chief of the Fraud Section within the Criminal Division of the DOJ.109 This
memorandum sets forth three steps in an enhanced FCPA enforcement strategy. 110
The first step involves the DOJ strengthening its investigative and prosecutorial efforts by significantly increasing its FCPA law enforcement resources. 111 This step
is very important because the new resources will substantially enhance “the ability
of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and the [FBI] to detect and prosecute individuals and companies that violate the FCPA.”112 The second step is the DOJ
98. Id.
99. Andrew Weissmann, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and
Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download.
100. Barr Benyamin et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2016).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1335-36.
106. Weissmann, supra note 99, at 1, n. 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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taking action to “strengthe[n] its coordination with foreign counterparts in the effort
to hold corrupt individuals and companies accountable.” 113 The third step, and the
most notable, is the guidance to FCPA attorneys about how the Fraud Section will
pursue what has come to be known as the Pilot Program.114
The Pilot Program ties in directly with the Yates Memorandum and applies to
companies that voluntarily cooperate or disclose matters during the one-year pilot
period under the FCPA.115 “The principal goal of this [P]rogram is to promote
greater accountability for individuals and companies that engage in corporate crime
by motivating companies to voluntarily selfdisclose FCPA-related misconduct, [to]
fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, [to] remediate flaws
in their controls and compliance programs.”116 If the Pilot Program is successful it
will “serve to further deter individuals and companies from engaging in FCPA violations in the first place [and] encourage companies to implement strong anti-corruption compliance programs to prevent and detect FCPA violations.” 117 Consistent
with the Yates Memorandum, if the Pilot Program is successful, it will also improve
the Fraud Section’s ability to prosecute individuals for their corporate wrongdoing,
many of whom likely would have gone undiscovered, by gathering proof that would
otherwise would not have been discovered.118
The Pilot Program “sets forth the requirements . . . a company must [fulfill in
order] to qualify for credit for voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and timely
and appropriate remediation.”119 The Pilot Program declared that full cooperation
by companies requires, “as set forth in the [Yates Memorandum], disclosure on a
timely basis of all facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue, including all facts related to involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s officers, employees or agents.”120 Thus, the meaning of “cooperation” is beginning to take new
shape as a result of the DOJ’s emphasis on individuals per both the Yates Memorandum and the Pilot Program.121 Since the Pilot Program has been implemented,
however, the DOJ has not necessarily been consistent in the amount of credit given
for the necessary cooperation it seeks from companies with respect to individuals. 122

IV.

FEARS OF EXPANSIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The enforcement landscape will drastically change if the DOJ strictly enforces
the Yates Memorandum and the federal judiciary maintains concerns about expansive criminal statutes.123 “The DOJ [may] succeed in bringing more criminal prosecutions [for corporate wrongdoing; however, this] success will likely come at a
significant cost.”124 Some prosecutors will predictably feel increased pressure to
“adopt more expansive statutory interpretations, exercise less caution when
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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evaluating the facts, or put more pressure on corporations to search for and to produce evidence of individual wrongdoing” due to the fact that the Yates Memorandum exerts pressure on prosecutors to further increase the number of prosecutions
in addition to their current efforts.125 “Strict enforcement of the Yates Memorandum
could also [alter] the way that corporations and individuals decide to cooperate with
the [DOJ].”126 In turn, this could then influence “the size, type, and number of corporate settlements.”127 Companies will have to consider whether they are willing to
cooperate, and if they are willing to cooperate at all, how they must readjust their
investigations to satisfy the DOJ.128 Thus, the law enforcement objectives that the
Memorandum aims to achieve may actually be hindered by these unintended consequences. 129
These conflicting trends, a “strong desire for individual accountability”, and
“worry about prosecutorial overreach” are nothing new. 130 For over a decade, in
order to resolve prominent criminal investigations, the DOJ “has entered into hundreds of plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution
agreements with companies.”131 Although settlements of this type involve admissions of guilt and billions of dollars in fines, the DOJ has not secured nearly “as
many comparable indictments and convictions of senior executives.” 132 In response
to these agreements, senior DOJ officials have begun voicing a variety of concerns.133 In relevant part, some officials have “questioned whether the companies
themselves withheld incriminating [evidence and] information about their senior
officers through the investigation process . . . succeed[ing] in preventing the prosecution of [these] individuals.”134
While the DOJ has these developing concerns, the federal judiciary has growing concerns of its own.135 Specifically, the federal judiciary has grown increasingly
dissatisfied with expansive interpretations of criminal statutes and over-criminalization in the United States Code.136 The Supreme Court has found “that narrower
interpretations reflect a more realistic view of congressional intent” and in recent
years, has continually rejected over-expansive interpretations of criminal statutes
with broad language.137

A. United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Once the Yates Memorandum came to light, it seems as though many were
under the impression that in cases of corporate wrongdoing, only the individuals
responsible would take the fall.138 United States v. Pacific Gas and Electric
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 899-900.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 900.
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138. See Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on
Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 Va. L. Rev. Online 51 (2015).
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Company,139 however, effectively illustrates why the federal judiciary is concerned
about over-criminalization as a result of federal prosecutors broadening the interpretation of the law; this case also provides a great example of a situation in which
individual accountability may still be unattainable.140
The prosecution of PG&E followed the rupture of a natural gas transmission
line owned and operated by the company on September 9, 2010, in San Bruno, California.141 PG&E was convicted of five counts of violating the federal Pipeline
Safety Act (“PSA”), and one count of obstructing the National Transportation
Safety Board investigation into the 2010 pipeline explosion. 142 In United States v.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,143 the DOJ indicted and convicted PG&E on a
theory of corporate collective knowledge, a largely unused basis for imposing criminal liability, which is what makes this case so significant. 144 The theory of corporate collective knowledge “seeks to aggregate prices of knowledge held by different
employees, and impute the totality of that knowledge to the corporation as a basis
for imposing criminal liability on the company.” 145
The indictment in this case alleged that PG&E knowingly and willfully violated
PSA violations by the following:
(1) failing to keep records of pressure testing and repairs on natural gas
transmission lines, (2) relying on erroneous and incomplete information
when evaluating the integrity of the natural gas transmissions lines, (3)
failing to identify and evaluate potential threats to the integrity of the
lines[,] and (4) failing to prioritize lines as high risk after a changed circumstance.146
With respect to these violations, this case is noteworthy due to the jury instructions filed in accordance with them, pertaining to the theory of corporate collective
knowledge.147 PG&E challenged this theory in a motion to dismiss the indictment
for erroneous instructions to the grand jury, arguing “that the prosecutor incorrectly
instructed the grand jury that they could issue an indictment for a knowing and
willful violation based on a regulatory duty to act and evidence that employees of
the company knew that the regulatory duty was not being met.” 148 The trial judge
denied the motion.149
In the final instruction to the jury on the PSA counts, the court instructed that:
[t]he corporation is . . . considered to have acquired the collective
knowledge of its employees. The corporation’s “knowledge” is therefore
the totality of what its employees know within the scope of their
139. United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No.14-cr-00175-TEH, 2016 BL 240175, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
July 26, 2016).
140. Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 12, at 899.
141. Solow & Farley, supra note 16, at 2.
142. Id. at 1.
143. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 BL 240175, at *1.
144. Id.; Solow & Farley, supra note 16, at 1.
145. Solow & Farley, supra note 16, at 1.
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employment. The willfulness of corporate employees acting within the
scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation. Accordingly, if
a specific employee acted willfully within the scope of his or her employment, then the corporation can be said to have acted willfully.150
The first part of this instruction is based on a 1987 decision pertaining to a cash
transaction reporting and has not been widely accepted in prior prosecutions. 151 As
a result of these instructions, PG&E was not only indicted under this theory, but
also convicted under the theory of corporate collective knowledge.152 Overall, these
jury instructions proved to be highly controversial and “PG&E filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government [did not meet its burden and]
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any single [PG&E] employee
acted willfully.”153
This decision could have significant impact on the future of corporate criminal
prosecutions.154 If PG&E’s motion for judgment of acquittal is unsuccessful, PG&E
will likely appeal the conviction and challenge the government’s theory of corporate liability before the Ninth Circuit. 155 No matter how the court decides the case,
its decision will be significant in shaping the future of corporate criminal prosecutions.156Regardless, this case has upended traditional principles of corporate vicarious liability by allowing the government to aggregate the innocent conduct of company employees to “manufacture a corporate criminal.”157 Nonetheless, this case
appears to directly contradict with the Yates Memorandum and its directives to hold
individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing. 158

V.

CONCLUSION

The issuing of the Yates Memorandum is a step in the right direction as the
DOJ shifts its focus to holding individuals accountable for their corporate crimes.
However, bringing individuals to justice likely will not be as easy as the Yates
Memorandum makes it out to be. The issuing of the Yates Memorandum will not
eliminate the overwhelming complexities involved with corporate criminal cases
and it also does not provide tools for prosecutors to effectively explain these complexities to a panel of jurors. Although these new directives will not eliminate the
risk prosecutors take in bringing a complex corporate crime to trial, the directives
and incentives will hopefully provide prosecutors with a better avenue to obtain all
of the relevant evidence needed to present a case to a jury, assuming that corporations cooperate with the DOJ.
Although the Yates Memorandum contains directives that will surely enhance
the DOJ’s capability in holding individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing,
it does not change the fact that pursuing individuals for the misconduct of
150.
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corporations presents its own unique challenges. Responsibility can be diffused in
large corporations and decisions are made at various levels.159 With this, it can be
extremely “difficult to determine if an employee possessed the knowledge and criminal intent necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”, much like the
situation the government faced in prosecuting the PG&E case.160 Particularly, highlevel executives may still be insulated from the day-to-day activities in which the
misconduct occurs.161These challenges, however, highlight the importance in the
DOJ fully using its resources in an effort to identify the blameworthy individuals at
all levels in corporate cases.162 Thus, the issuing of the Yates Memorandum, paired
with the Pilot Program, provided the directives and incentives for the DOJ to make
a necessary shift to individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. This shift
may not resolve all challenges that prosecuting corporate crime presents, but it is
surely a step in the right direction.
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